

Trust Facts

Launch date: 1926

Wind-up date: None

Year end: 31 December

Dividends paid:

Quarterly in March, June, September and December

AGM:

March

Benchmark:

FTSE All-Share

ISA status:

May be held in an ISA

Capital Structure:

Share class No. in issue Sedol Ordinary 66,872,765 0882532

Debt:

9.875% Debenture Stock 2017 £25m 5.50% Debenture Stock 2021 £38m 4.05% Private Placement Loan 2028 £50m

Charges:

Ongoing charge: 0.49% (30.06.16) Includes a management fee of 0.35%

Board of Directors:

John Reeve (Chairman) Arthur Copple Richard Jewson June de Moller Lesley Sherratt David Webster

Auditors: Ernst & Young LLP

Investment Manager:

Investec Fund Managers Ltd

Registrars: Equiniti Ltd

Savings Scheme Administrator:

Equiniti Financial Services Ltd

Secretary:

Investec Asset Management Ltd

Stockbrokers: JPMorgan Cazenove

Depositary & Custodian: HSBC Bank Plc

Trust Objective

To provide growth in income and capital to achieve a long term total return greater than the benchmark FTSE All-Share Index, through investment primarily in UK securities. The Company's policy is to invest in a broad spread of securities with typically the majority of the portfolio selected from the constituents of the FTSE 350 Index.

Financial Data

| Total Assets (£m) | 897.6 |
|------------------------------------|--------|
| Share price (p) | 1159.0 |
| NAV (p) (ex income, debt at mkt) | 1198.6 |
| Premium/(Discount), Ex income (%) | -3.3 |
| NAV (p) (cum income, debt at mkt) | 1225.6 |
| Premium/(Discount), Cum income (%) | -5.4 |
| Historic net yield (%) | 3.5 |

Top Ten Equity Holdings (%)1

| HSBC Holdings Plc | 7.7 |
|-------------------------------|------|
| GlaxoSmithKline Plc | 6.6 |
| Royal Dutch Shell Plc Class B | 5.6 |
| BP Plc | 4.9 |
| Grafton Group Plc | 4.2 |
| Barclays Plc | 3.9 |
| Lloyds Banking Group Plc | 3.4 |
| WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc | 2.8 |
| Tesco Plc | 2.7 |
| Royal Bank of Scotland Plc | 2.5 |
| Total | 44.3 |

^{1%} of total assets, including cash

Dividend History

| Type | Amount (p) | XD date | Pay date |
|-------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| 3 rd interim | 8.09 | 08-Dec-16 | 30-Dec-16 |
| 2 nd interim | 8.09 | 08-Sep-16 | 30-Sep-16 |
| 1 st interim | 8.09 | 09-Jun-16 | 30-Jun-16 |
| Final | 15.87 | 10-Mar-16 | 31-Mar-16 |

Performance

Share Price % change²

| | Trust | FTSE All-Share |
|----------|-------|------------------|
| 1 month | 3.4 | - 2.0 |
| 3 months | 4.4 | - 0.1 |
| 1 year | 8.7 | 5.7 |
| 3 years | -5.8 | 4.1 |
| 5 years | 33.8 | 30.2 |
| | | |

²Capital return only


NAV total return % change³

| | Trust | FTSE All-Share |
|----------|-------|----------------|
| 1 month | -1.5 | -1.6 |
| 3 months | 1.6 | 0.6 |
| 1 year | 12.3 | 9.8 |
| 3 years | 11.6 | 15.7 |
| 5 years | 73.2 | 55.4 |
| | | |

³Total return

Performance, Price and Yield information is sourced from Morningstar as at 30.11.16.

Sector Analysis



Past performance should not be taken as a guide to the future and dividend growth is not guaranteed. The value of your shares in Temple Bar and the income from them can fall as well as rise and you may lose money. This Trust may not be appropriate for investors who plan to withdraw their money within the short to medium term.

A portion (60%) of the Trust's management and financing expenses are charged to its capital account rather than to its income, which has the effect of increasing the Trust's income (which may be taxable) whilst reducing its capital to an equivalent extent. This could constrain future capital and income growth.

The effect of borrowings to finance the Trust's investments is to magnify the volatility of its price and potential gains and losses. We recommend that you seek independent financial advice to ensure this Trust is suitable for your investment needs.





Manager's Commentary

Thought for the month

Over many years I have found myself sharing platforms with other fund managers enthusiastically selling their wares. It is always enjoyable and thought provoking to hear others' views, but just as interesting to watch various patterns emerge. For example, while some investment strategies such as equity income are 'everpresents' on the circuit, others (130/30 funds, structured products, target date funds and so on) come and go depending on market moods and investing fashions.

Other strategies, such as Japanese Equities – still the 3rd biggest stockmarket and economy in the world – seem to receive surprisingly little air-time, perhaps reflective of the number of times the industry has tried to call the bottom of that market or, even worse, the number of times the industry has confused a temporary peak with a new paradigm.

As well as patterns and trends in strategies presented, there are also patterns in investing styles. In years gone by, most fund managers would profess to blending a macroeconomic view with a bottom-up stock-picking approach. This is now less trendy – or at least less trendy to admit to – and bottom-up is the flavour of the day.

However, what has become even more apparent is the current trend of investing like Warren Buffett. Obviously, it is dangerous to criticise anyone seeking to emulate the Sage of Omaha, but it is tempting to believe we have reached 'peak Buffett'. The books have all been read, the screens have been constructed and the Kool-Aid drunk.

This search for companies with supposedly unassailable advantages raises two, quite probably inter-connected, issues. Firstly, once signed up as a Buffett acolyte, there is not much wriggle room on what stocks to own. So something has to give – either the price paid, as demand for the perfect stock outstrips supply, or the stock – as the 'Buffett-type stock' tag is handed out far too liberally.

Secondly, Buffet's recent actions suggest he may have moved on, with much of his recent, high profile, activity more involved with for example, taking mezzanine positions in private equity deals. Maybe this reflects the massive deals he needs to do to move the performance needle or perhaps we are receiving a skewed view of what he is actually doing across his whole portfolio, but it does at least make one wonder if he believes that the market for his typical investment is currently far too crowded.

Buffett's investment style has of course been great to follow over many years, but like all styles it has its good and not so good times. The good times for Buffetologists in the last few years have, not surprisingly, coincided with not so good times for Value investors. Whilst we do not yet feel quite as popular as Buzz Lightyear, perhaps our Woody period is now behind us?

The yield information has been calculated as at 30.11.16. All other information is from Investec Asset Management at 30.11.16.

Telephone calls may be recorded for training and quality assurance purposes.

For further details, call the Investor Services Department on 020 7597 1800, or send an email to enquiries@investecmail.com. Alternatively, visit the Temple Bar website: www.templebarinvestments.co.uk.

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